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Abstract: This paper was the first initiative to try to define Web2.0 and understand its 
implications for the next generation of software, looking at both design patterns and 
business modes. Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; 
Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that 
platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more 
people use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual 
users, while providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, 
creating network effects through an "architecture of participation," and going beyond the 
page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences. 
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he bursting of the dot-com bubble in the autumn of 2001 marked a 
turning point for the web. Many people concluded that the web was 
overhyped, when in fact bubbles and consequent shakeouts appear 
to be a common feature of all technological revolutions. Shakeouts typically 
mark the point at which an ascendant technology is ready to take its place at 
center stage. The pretenders are given the bum's rush, the real success 
stories show their strength, and there begins to be an understanding of what 
separates one from the other. 
 T
The concept of "Web 2.0" began with a conference brainstorming session 
between O'Reilly and MediaLive International. Dale Dougherty, web pioneer 
and O'Reilly VP, noted that far from having "crashed", the web was more 
important than ever, with exciting new applications and sites popping up with 
surprising regularity. What's more, the companies that had survived the 
collapse seemed to have some things in common. Could it be that the dot-
com collapse marked some kind of turning point for the web, such that a call 
to action such as "Web 2.0" might make sense? We agreed that it did, and 
so the Web 2.0 Conference was born. 
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In the year and a half since, the term "Web 2.0" has clearly taken hold, 
with more than 9.5 million citations in Google (defintion posted on the Web 
on September 2005; 135 million citations af of February 2007). But there's 
still a huge amount of disagreement about just what Web 2.0 means, with 
some people decrying it as a meaningless marketing buzzword, and others 
accepting it as the new conventional wisdom. 
This article is an attempt to clarify just what we mean by Web 2.0. 
In our initial brainstorming, we formulated our sense of Web 2.0 by 
example: 
Web 1.0   Web 2.0 
DoubleClick --> Google AdSense  
Ofoto --> Flickr 
Akamai --> BitTorrent 
mp3.com --> Napster 
Britannica Online --> Wikipedia 
personal websites --> blogging 
evite --> upcoming.org and EVDB 
domain name speculation --> search engine optimization
page views --> cost per click 
screen scraping --> web services 
publishing --> participation 
content management systems --> wikis 
directories (taxonomy) --> tagging ("folksonomy") 
stickiness --> syndication 
The list went on and on. But what was it that made us identify one 
application or approach as "Web 1.0" and another as "Web 2.0"? (The 
question is particularly urgent because the Web 2.0 meme has become so 
widespread that companies are now pasting it on as a marketing buzzword, 
with no real understanding of just what it means. The question is particularly 
difficult because many of those buzzword-addicted startups are definitely not 
Web 2.0, while some of the applications we identified as Web 2.0, like 
Napster and BitTorrent, are not even properly web applications!) We began 
trying to tease out the principles that are demonstrated in one way or 
another by the success stories of web 1.0 and by the most interesting of the 
new applications. 
  The Web as platform 
Like many important concepts, Web 2.0 doesn't have a hard boundary, 
but rather, a gravitational core. You can visualize Web 2.0 as a set of 
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principles and practices that tie together a veritable solar system of sites that 
demonstrate some or all of those principles, at a varying distance from that 
core. 
At the first Web 2.0 conference, in October 2004, we listed a preliminary 
set of principles in our opening talk. The first of those principles was "The 
web as platform". Yet that was also a rallying cry of Web 1.0 darling 
Netscape, which went down in flames after a heated battle with Microsoft. 
What's more, two of our initial Web 1.0 exemplars, DoubleClick and Akamai, 
were both pioneers in treating the web as a platform. People don't often 
think of it as "web services", but in fact, ad serving was the first widely 
deployed web service, and the first widely deployed "mashup" (to use 
another term that has gained currency of late). Every banner ad is served as 
a seamless cooperation between two websites, delivering an integrated 
page to a reader on yet another computer. Akamai also treats the network 
as the platform, and at a deeper level of the stack, building a transparent 
caching and content delivery network that eases bandwidth congestion. 
Nonetheless, these pioneers provided useful contrasts because later 
entrants have taken their solution to the same problem even further, 
understanding something deeper about the nature of the new platform. Both 
DoubleClick and Akamai were Web 2.0 pioneers, yet we can also see how 
it's possible to realize more of the possibilities by embracing additional Web 
2.0 design patterns. 
Let's drill down for a moment into each of these three cases, teasing out 
some of the essential elements of difference. 
Netscape vs. Google 
If Netscape was the standard bearer for Web 1.0, Google is most 
certainly the standard bearer for Web 2.0, if only because their respective 
IPOs were defining events for each era. So let's start with a comparison of 
these two companies and their positioning. 
Netscape framed "the web as platform" in terms of the old software 
paradigm: their flagship product was the web browser, a desktop application, 
and their strategy was to use their dominance in the browser market to 
establish a market for high-priced server products. Control over standards 
for displaying content and applications in the browser would, in theory, give 
Netscape the kind of market power enjoyed by Microsoft in the PC market. 
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Much like the "horseless carriage" framed the automobile as an extension of 
the familiar, Netscape promoted a "webtop" to replace the desktop, and 
planned to populate that webtop with information updates and applets 
pushed to the webtop by information providers who would purchase 
Netscape servers. 
In the end, both web browsers and web servers turned out to be 
commodities, and value moved "up the stack" to services delivered over the 
web platform. 
Google, by contrast, began its life as a native web application, never sold 
or packaged, but delivered as a service, with customers paying, directly or 
indirectly, for the use of that service. None of the trappings of the old 
software industry are present. No scheduled software releases, just 
continuous improvement. No licensing or sale, just usage. No porting to 
different platforms so that customers can run the software on their own 
equipment, just a massively scalable collection of commodity PCs running 
open source operating systems plus homegrown applications and utilities 
that no one outside the company ever gets to see. 
At bottom, Google requires a competency that Netscape never needed: 
database management. Google isn't just a collection of software tools, it's a 
specialized database. Without the data, the tools are useless; without the 
software, the data is unmanageable. Software licensing and control over 
APIs - the lever of power in the previous era - is irrelevant because the 
software never need be distributed but only performed, and also because 
without the ability to collect and manage the data, the software is of little use. 
In fact, the value of the software is proportional to the scale and dynamism 
of the data it helps to manage. 
Google's service is not a server - though it is delivered by a massive 
collection of internet servers - nor a browser - though it is experienced by the 
user within the browser. Nor does its flagship search service even host the 
content that it enables users to find. Much like a phone call, which happens 
not just on the phones at either end of the call, but on the network in 
between, Google happens in the space between browser and search engine 
and destination content server, as an enabler or middleman between the 
user and his or her online experience. 
While both Netscape and Google could be described as software 
companies, it's clear that Netscape belonged to the same software world as 
Lotus, Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, and other companies that got their start in the 
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1980's software revolution, while Google's fellows are other internet 
applications like eBay, Amazon, Napster, and yes, DoubleClick and Akamai. 
DoubleClick vs. Overture and AdSense 
Like Google, DoubleClick is a true child of the internet era. It harnesses 
software as a service, has a core competency in data management, and, as 
noted above, was a pioneer in web services long before web services even 
had a name. However, DoubleClick was ultimately limited by its business 
model. It bought into the '90s notion that the web was about publishing, not 
participation; that advertisers, not consumers, ought to call the shots; that 
size mattered, and that the internet was increasingly being dominated by the 
top websites as measured by MediaMetrix and other web ad scoring 
companies. 
As a result, DoubleClick proudly cites on its website: "over 2000 
successful implementations" of its software. Yahoo! Search Marketing 
(formerly Overture) and Google AdSense, by contrast, already serve 
hundreds of thousands of advertisers apiece. 
Overture and Google's success came from an understanding of what 
Chris Anderson refers to as "the long tail," the collective power of the small 
sites that make up the bulk of the web's content. DoubleClick's offerings 
require a formal sales contract, limiting their market to the few thousand 
largest websites. Overture and Google figured out how to enable ad 
placement on virtually any web page. What's more, they eschewed 
publisher/ad-agency friendly advertising formats such as banner ads and 
popups in favor of minimally intrusive, context-sensitive, consumer-friendly 
text advertising. 
The Web 2.0 lesson: leverage customer-self service and algorithmic data 
management to reach out to the entire web, to the edges and not just the 
center, to the long tail and not just the head. 
Not surprisingly, other web 2.0 success stories demonstrate this same 
behavioUr. eBay enables occasional transactions of only a few dollars 
between single individuals, acting as an automated intermediary. Napster 
(though shut down for legal reasons) built its network not by building a 
centralized song database, but by architecting a system in such a way that 
every downloader also became a server, and thus grew the network. 
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Akamai vs. BitTorrent 
Like DoubleClick, Akamai is optimized to do business with the head, not 
the tail, with the center, not the edges. While it serves the benefit of the 
individuals at the edge of the web by smoothing their access to the high-
demand sites at the center, it collects its revenue from those central sites. 
BitTorrent, like other pioneers in the P2P movement, takes a radical 
approach to internet decentralization. Every client is also a server; files are 
broken up into fragments that can be served from multiple locations, 
transparently harnessing the network of downloaders to provide both 
bandwidth and data to other users. The more popular the file, in fact, the 
faster it can be served, as there are more users providing bandwidth and 
fragments of the complete file. 
BitTorrent thus demonstrates a key Web 2.0 principle: the service 
automatically gets better the more people use it. While Akamai must add 
servers to improve service, every BitTorrent consumer brings his own 
resources to the party. There's an implicit "architecture of participation", a 
built-in ethic of cooperation, in which the service acts primarily as an 
intelligent broker, connecting the edges to each other and harnessing the 
power of the users themselves. 
  Harnessing collective intelligence 
The central principle behind the success of the giants born in the Web 
1.0 era who have survived to lead the Web 2.0 era appears to be this, that 
they have embraced the power of the web to harness collective intelligence: 
• Hyperlinking is the foundation of the web. As users add new content, 
and new sites, it is bound in to the structure of the web by other users 
discovering the content and linking to it. Much as synapses form in the brain, 
with associations becoming stronger through repetition or intensity, the web 
of connections grows organically as an output of the collective activity of all 
web users.  
• Yahoo!, the first great internet success story, was born as a catalog, 
or directory of links, an aggregation of the best work of thousands, then 
millions of web users. While Yahoo! has since moved into the business of 
creating many types of content, its role as a portal to the collective work of 
the net's users remains the core of its value.  
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• Google's breakthrough in search, which quickly made it the 
undisputed search market leader, was PageRank, a method of using the link 
structure of the web, rather than just the characteristics of documents to 
provide better search results.  
• eBay's product is the collective activity of all its users; like the web 
itself, eBay grows organically in response to user activity, and the company's 
role is as an enabler of a context in which that user activity can happen. 
What's more, eBay's competitive advantage comes almost entirely from the 
critical mass of buyers and sellers, which makes any new entrant offering 
similar services significantly less attractive.  
• Amazon sells the same products as competitors such as 
Barnesandnoble.com, and they receive the same product descriptions, cover 
images, and editorial content from their vendors. But Amazon has made a 
science of user engagement. They have an order of magnitude more user 
reviews, invitations to participate in varied ways on virtually every page--and 
even more importantly, they use user activity to produce better search 
results. While a Barnesandnoble.com search is likely to lead with the 
company's own products, or sponsored results, Amazon always leads with 
"most popular", a real-time computation based not only on sales but other 
factors that Amazon insiders call the "flow" around products. With an order 
of magnitude more user participation, it's no surprise that Amazon's sales 
also outpace competitors.  
Now, innovative companies that pick up on this insight and perhaps 
extend it even further, are making their mark on the web: 
• Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia based on the unlikely notion that an 
entry can be added by any web user, and edited by any other, is a radical 
experiment in trust, applying Eric Raymond's dictum (originally coined in the 
context of open source software) that "with enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow," to content creation. Wikipedia is already in the top 100 websites, 
and many think it will be in the top ten before long. This is a profound 
change in the dynamics of content creation!  
• Sites like del.icio.us and Flickr, two companies that have received a 
great deal of attention of late, have pioneered a concept that some people 
call "folksonomy" (in contrast to taxonomy), a style of collaborative 
categorization of sites using freely chosen keywords, often referred to as 
tags. Tagging allows for the kind of multiple, overlapping associations that 
the brain itself uses, rather than rigid categories. In the canonical example, a 
Flickr photo of a puppy might be tagged both "puppy" and "cute"--allowing 
for retrieval along natural axes generated user activity.  
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• Collaborative spam filtering products like Cloudmark aggregate the 
individual decisions of email users about what is and is not spam, 
outperforming systems that rely on analysis of the messages themselves.  
• It is a truism that the greatest internet success stories don't advertise 
their products. Their adoption is driven by "viral marketing"--that is, 
recommendations propagating directly from one user to another. You can 
almost make the case that if a site or product relies on advertising to get the 
word out, it isn't Web 2.0.  
• Even much of the infrastructure of the web - including the Linux, 
Apache, MySQL, and Perl, PHP, or Python code involved in most web 
servers - relies on the peer-production methods of open source, in 
themselves an instance of collective, net-enabled intelligence. There are 
more than 100,000 open source software projects listed on 
SourceForge.net. Anyone can add a project, anyone can download and use 
the code, and new projects migrate from the edges to the center as a result 
of users putting them to work, an organic software adoption process relying 
almost entirely on viral marketing.  
The lesson: Network effects from user contributions are the key to market 
dominance in the Web 2.0 era. 
Blogging and the wisdom of crowds 
One of the most highly touted features of the Web 2.0 era is the rise of 
blogging. Personal home pages have been around since the early days of 
the web, and the personal diary and daily opinion column around much 
longer than that, so just what is the fuss all about? 
At its most basic, a blog is just a personal home page in diary format. But 
as Rich Skrenta notes, the chronological organization of a blog: "seems like 
a trivial difference, but it drives an entirely different delivery, advertising and 
value chain". 
One of the things that has made a difference is a technology called RSS. 
RSS is the most significant advance in the fundamental architecture of the 
web since early hackers realized that CGI could be used to create database-
backed websites. RSS allows someone to link not just to a page, but to 
subscribe to it, with notification every time that page changes. Skrenta calls 
this "the incremental web". Others call it the "live web". 
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Now, of course, "dynamic websites" (i.e., database-backed sites with 
dynamically generated content) replaced static web pages well over ten 
years ago. What's dynamic about the live web are not just the pages, but the 
links. A link to a weblog is expected to point to a perennially changing page, 
with "permalinks" for any individual entry, and notification for each change. 
An RSS feed is thus a much stronger link than, say a bookmark or a link to a 
single page. 
RSS also means that the web browser is not the only means of viewing a 
web page. While some RSS aggregators, such as Bloglines, are web-based, 
others are desktop clients, and still others allow users of portable devices to 
subscribe to constantly updated content. 
RSS is now being used to push not just notices of new blog entries, but 
also all kinds of data updates, including stock quotes, weather data, and 
photo availability. This use is actually a return to one of its roots: RSS was 
born in 1997 out of the confluence of Dave Winer's "Really Simple 
Syndication" technology, used to push out blog updates, and Netscape's 
"Rich Site Summary", which allowed users to create custom Netscape home 
pages with regularly updated data flows. Netscape lost interest, and the 
technology was carried forward by blogging pioneer Userland, Winer's 
company. In the current crop of applications, we see, though, the heritage of 
both parents. 
But RSS is only part of what makes a weblog different from an ordinary 
web page. Tom Coates remarks on the significance of the permalink: 
It may seem like a trivial piece of functionality now, but it was effectively 
the device that turned weblogs from an ease-of-publishing phenomenon into 
a conversational mess of overlapping communities. For the first time it 
became relatively easy to gesture directly at a highly specific post on 
someone else's site and talk about it. Discussion emerged. Chat emerged. 
And - as a result - friendships emerged or became more entrenched. The 
permalink was the first - and most successful - attempt to build bridges 
between weblogs. 
In many ways, the combination of RSS and permalinks adds many of the 
features of NNTP, the Network News Protocol of the Usenet, onto HTTP, the 
web protocol. The "blogosphere" can be thought of as a new, peer-to-peer 
equivalent to Usenet and bulletin-boards, the conversational watering holes 
of the early internet. Not only can people subscribe to each others' sites, and 
easily link to individual comments on a page, but also, via a mechanism 
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known as trackbacks, they can see when anyone else links to their pages, 
and can respond, either with reciprocal links, or by adding comments. 
Interestingly, two-way links were the goal of early hypertext systems like 
Xanadu. Hypertext purists have celebrated trackbacks as a step towards two 
way links. But note that trackbacks are not properly two-way - rather, they 
are really (potentially) symmetrical one-way links that create the effect of two 
way links. The difference may seem subtle, but in practice it is enormous. 
Social networking systems like Friendster, Orkut, and LinkedIn, which 
require acknowledgment by the recipient in order to establish a connection, 
lack the same scalability as the web. As noted by Caterina Fake, co-founder 
of the Flickr photo sharing service, attention is only coincidentally reciprocal. 
(Flickr thus allows users to set watch lists - any user can subscribe to any 
other user's photostream via RSS. The object of attention is notified, but 
does not have to approve the connection.) 
If an essential part of Web 2.0 is harnessing collective intelligence, 
turning the web into a kind of global brain, the blogosphere is the equivalent 
of constant mental chatter in the forebrain, the voice we hear in all of our 
heads. It may not reflect the deep structure of the brain, which is often 
unconscious, but is instead the equivalent of conscious thought. And as a 
reflection of conscious thought and attention, the blogosphere has begun to 
have a powerful effect. 
First, because search engines use link structure to help predict useful 
pages, bloggers, as the most prolific and timely linkers, have a 
disproportionate role in shaping search engine results. Second, because the 
blogging community is so highly self-referential, bloggers paying attention to 
other bloggers magnifies their visibility and power. The "echo chamber" that 
critics decry is also an amplifier. 
If it were merely an amplifier, blogging would be uninteresting. But like 
Wikipedia, blogging harnesses collective intelligence as a kind of filter. What 
James Suriowecki calls "the wisdom of crowds" comes into play, and much 
as PageRank produces better results than analysis of any individual 
document, the collective attention of the blogosphere selects for value. 
While mainstream media may see individual blogs as competitors, what 
is really unnerving is that the competition is with the blogosphere as a whole. 
This is not just a competition between sites, but a competition between 
business models. The world of Web 2.0 is also the world of what Dan 
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Gillmor calls "we, the media", a world in which "the former audience", not a 
few people in a back room, decides what's important. 
  Data is the next Intel Inside 
Every significant internet application to date has been backed by a 
specialized database: Google's web crawl, Yahoo!'s directory (and web 
crawl), Amazon's database of products, eBay's database of products and 
sellers, MapQuest's map databases, Napster's distributed song database. 
As Hal Varian remarked in a personal conversation last year, "SQL is the 
new HTML." Database management is a core competency of Web 2.0 
companies, so much so that we have sometimes referred to these 
applications as "infoware" rather than merely software. 
This fact leads to a key question: Who owns the data? 
In the internet era, one can already see a number of cases where control 
over the database has led to market control and outsized financial returns. 
The monopoly on domain name registry initially granted by government fiat 
to Network Solutions (later purchased by Verisign) was one of the first great 
moneymakers of the internet. While we've argued that business advantage 
via controlling software APIs is much more difficult in the age of the internet, 
control of key data sources is not, especially if those data sources are 
expensive to create or amenable to increasing returns via network effects. 
Look at the copyright notices at the base of every map served by 
MapQuest, maps.yahoo.com, maps.msn.com, or maps.google.com, and 
you'll see the line "Maps copyright NavTeq, TeleAtlas," or with the new 
satellite imagery services, "Images copyright Digital Globe." These 
companies made substantial investments in their databases (NavTeq alone 
reportedly invested USD 750 million to build their database of street 
addresses and directions. Digital Globe spent USD 500 million to launch 
their own satellite to improve on government-supplied imagery.) NavTeq has 
gone so far as to imitate Intel's familiar Intel Inside logo: cars with navigation 
systems bear the imprint, "NavTeq Onboard." Data is indeed the Intel Inside 
of these applications, a sole source component in systems whose software 
infrastructure is largely open source or otherwise commodified. 
The now hotly contested web mapping arena demonstrates how a failure 
to understand the importance of owning an application's core data will 
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eventually undercut its competitive position. MapQuest pioneered the web 
mapping category in 1995, yet when Yahoo!, and then Microsoft, and most 
recently Google, decided to enter the market, they were easily able to offer a 
competing application simply by licensing the same data. 
Contrast, however, the position of Amazon.com. Like competitors such 
as Barnesandnoble.com, its original database came from ISBN registry 
provider R.R. Bowker. But unlike MapQuest, Amazon relentlessly enhanced 
the data, adding publisher-supplied data such as cover images, table of 
contents, index, and sample material. Even more importantly, they 
harnessed their users to annotate the data, such that after ten years, 
Amazon, not Bowker, is the primary source for bibliographic data on books, 
a reference source for scholars and librarians as well as consumers. 
Amazon also introduced their own proprietary identifier, the ASIN, which 
corresponds to the ISBN where one is present, and creates an equivalent 
namespace for products without one. Effectively, Amazon "embraced and 
extended" their data suppliers. 
Imagine if MapQuest had done the same thing, harnessing their users to 
annotate maps and directions, adding layers of value. It would have been 
much more difficult for competitors to enter the market just by licensing the 
base data. 
The recent introduction of Google Maps provides a living laboratory for 
the competition between application vendors and their data suppliers. 
Google's lightweight programming model has led to the creation of 
numerous value-added services in the form of mashups that link Google 
Maps with other internet-accessible data sources. Paul Rademacher's 
housingmaps.com, which combines Google Maps with Craigslist apartment 
rental and home purchase data to create an interactive housing search tool, 
is the pre-eminent example of such a mashup. 
At present, these mashups are mostly innovative experiments, done by 
hackers. But entrepreneurial activity follows close behind. And already, one 
can see that for at least one class of developer, Google has taken the role of 
data source away from Navteq and inserted themselves as a favored 
intermediary. We expect to see battles between data suppliers and 
application vendors in the next few years, as both realize just how important 
certain classes of data will become as building blocks for Web 2.0 
applications. 
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The race is on to own certain classes of core data: location, identity, 
calendaring of public events, product identifiers and namespaces. In many 
cases, where there is significant cost to create the data, there may be an 
opportunity for an Intel Inside style play, with a single source for the data. In 
others, the winner will be the company that first reaches critical mass via 
user aggregation, and turns that aggregated data into a system service. 
For example, in the area of identity, PayPal, Amazon's 1-click, and the 
millions of users of communications systems, may all be legitimate 
contenders to build a network-wide identity database. (In this regard, 
Google's recent attempt to use cell phone numbers as an identifier for Gmail 
accounts may be a step towards embracing and extending the phone 
system.) Meanwhile, startups like Sxip are exploring the potential of 
federated identity, in quest of a kind of "distributed 1-click" that will provide a 
seamless Web 2.0 identity subsystem. In the area of calendaring, EVDB is 
an attempt to build the world's largest shared calendar via a wiki-style 
architecture of participation. While the jury's still out on the success of any 
particular startup or approach, it's clear that standards and solutions in these 
areas, effectively turning certain classes of data into reliable subsystems of 
the "internet operating system", will enable the next generation of 
applications. 
A further point must be noted with regard to data, and that is user 
concerns about privacy and their rights to their own data. In many of the 
early web applications, copyright is only loosely enforced. For example, 
Amazon lays claim to any reviews submitted to the site, but in the absence 
of enforcement, people may repost the same review elsewhere. However, as 
companies begin to realize that control over data may be their chief source 
of competitive advantage, we may see heightened attempts at control. 
Much as the rise of proprietary software led to the Free Software 
movement, we expect the rise of proprietary databases to result in a Free 
Data movement within the next decade. One can see early signs of this 
countervailing trend in open data projects such as Wikipedia, the Creative 
Commons, and in software projects like Greasemonkey, which allow users 
to take control of how data is displayed on their computer. 
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  End of the software release cycle 
As noted above in the discussion of Google vs. Netscape, one of the 
defining characteristics of internet era software is that it is delivered as a 
service, not as a product. This fact leads to a number of fundamental 
changes in the business model of such a company: 
1. Operations must become a core competency. Google's or Yahoo!'s 
expertise in product development must be matched by an expertise in daily 
operations. So fundamental is the shift from software as artifact to software 
as service that the software will cease to perform unless it is maintained on a 
daily basis. Google must continuously crawl the web and update its indices, 
continuously filter out link spam and other attempts to influence its results, 
continuously and dynamically respond to hundreds of millions of 
asynchronous user queries, simultaneously matching them with context-
appropriate advertisements.  
It's no accident that Google's system administration, networking, and load 
balancing techniques are perhaps even more closely guarded secrets than 
their search algorithms. Google's success at automating these processes is 
a key part of their cost advantage over competitors. 
It's also no accident that scripting languages such as Perl, Python, PHP, 
and now Ruby, play such a large role at web 2.0 companies. Perl was 
famously described by Hassan Schroeder, Sun's first webmaster, as "the 
duct tape of the internet." Dynamic languages (often called scripting 
languages and looked down on by the software engineers of the era of 
software artifacts) are the tool of choice for system and network 
administrators, as well as application developers building dynamic systems 
that require constant change. 
2. Users must be treated as co-developers, in a reflection of open source 
development practices (even if the software in question is unlikely to be 
released under an open source license.) The open source dictum, "release 
early and release often" in fact has morphed into an even more radical 
position, "the perpetual beta," in which the product is developed in the open, 
with new features slipstreamed in on a monthly, weekly, or even daily basis. 
It's no accident that services such as Gmail, Google Maps, Flickr, del.icio.us, 
and the like may be expected to bear a "Beta" logo for years at a time.  
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Real time monitoring of user behavior to see just which new features are 
used, and how they are used, thus becomes another required core 
competency. A web developer at a major online service remarked:  
"We put up two or three new features on some part of the site every 
day, and if users don't adopt them, we take them down. If they like 
them, we roll them out to the entire site." 
Cal Henderson, the lead developer of Flickr, recently revealed that they 
deploy new builds up to every half hour. This is clearly a radically different 
development model! While not all web applications are developed in as 
extreme a style as Flickr, almost all web applications have a development 
cycle that is radically unlike anything from the PC or client-server era. It is for 
this reason that a recent ZDnet editorial concluded that Microsoft won't be 
able to beat Google:  
"Microsoft's business model depends on everyone upgrading their 
computing environment every two to three years. Google's depends on 
everyone exploring what's new in their computing environment every 
day." 
While Microsoft has demonstrated enormous ability to learn from and 
ultimately best its competition, there's no question that this time, the 
competition will require Microsoft (and by extension, every other existing 
software company) to become a deeply different kind of company. Native 
Web 2.0 companies enjoy a natural advantage, as they don't have old 
patterns (and corresponding business models and revenue sources) to 
shed. 
  Lightweight programming models 
Once the idea of web services became au courant, large companies 
jumped into the fray with a complex web services stack designed to create 
highly reliable programming environments for distributed applications. 
But much as the web succeeded precisely because it overthrew much of 
hypertext theory, substituting a simple pragmatism for ideal design, RSS has 
become perhaps the single most widely deployed web service because of its 
simplicity, while the complex corporate web services stacks have yet to 
achieve wide deployment. 
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Similarly, Amazon.com's web services are provided in two forms: one 
adhering to the formalisms of the SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) 
web services stack, the other simply providing XML data over HTTP, in a 
lightweight approach sometimes referred to as REST (Representational 
State Transfer). While high value B2B connections (like those between 
Amazon and retail partners like ToysRUs) use the SOAP stack, Amazon 
reports that 95% of the usage is of the lightweight REST service. 
This same quest for simplicity can be seen in other "organic" web 
services. Google's recent release of Google Maps is a case in point. Google 
Maps' simple AJAX (Javascript and XML) interface was quickly decrypted by 
hackers, who then proceeded to remix the data into new services. 
Mapping-related web services had been available for some time from 
GIS vendors such as ESRI as well as from MapQuest and Microsoft 
MapPoint. But Google Maps set the world on fire because of its simplicity. 
While experimenting with any of the formal vendor-supported web services 
required a formal contract between the parties, the way Google Maps was 
implemented left the data for the taking, and hackers soon found ways to 
creatively re-use that data. 
There are several significant lessons here: 
• Support lightweight programming models that allow for loosely 
coupled systems. The complexity of the corporate-sponsored web services 
stack is designed to enable tight coupling. While this is necessary in many 
cases, many of the most interesting applications can indeed remain loosely 
coupled, and even fragile. The Web 2.0 mindset is very different from the 
traditional IT mindset!  
• Think syndication, not coordination. Simple web services, like RSS 
and REST-based web services, are about syndicating data outwards, not 
controlling what happens when it gets to the other end of the connection. 
This idea is fundamental to the internet itself, a reflection of what is known 
as the end-to-end principle.  
• Design for "hackability" and remixability. Systems like the original 
web, RSS, and AJAX all have this in common: the barriers to re-use are 
extremely low. Much of the useful software is actually open source, but even 
when it isn't, there is little in the way of intellectual property protection. The 
web browser's "View Source" option made it possible for any user to copy 
any other user's web page; RSS was designed to empower the user to view 
the content s/he wants, when it's wanted, not at the behest of the information 
provider; the most successful web services are those that have been easiest 
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to take in new directions unimagined by their creators. The phrase "some 
rights reserved", which was popularized by the Creative Commons to 
contrast with the more typical "all rights reserved", is a useful guidepost.  
Innovation in assembly 
Lightweight business models are a natural concomitant of lightweight 
programming and lightweight connections. The Web 2.0 mindset is good at 
re-use. A new service like housingmaps.com was built simply by snapping 
together two existing services. Housingmaps.com doesn't have a business 
model (yet) - but for many small-scale services, Google AdSense (or 
perhaps Amazon associates fees, or both) provides the snap-in equivalent of 
a revenue model. 
These examples provide an insight into another key web 2.0 principle, 
which we call "innovation in assembly". When commodity components are 
abundant, you can create value simply by assembling them in novel or 
effective ways. Much as the PC revolution provided many opportunities for 
innovation in assembly of commodity hardware, with companies like Dell 
making a science out of such assembly, thereby defeating companies whose 
business model required innovation in product development, we believe that 
Web 2.0 will provide opportunities for companies to beat the competition by 
getting better at harnessing and integrating services provided by others. 
  Software above the level of a single device 
One other feature of Web 2.0 that deserves mention is the fact that it's no 
longer limited to the PC platform. In his parting advice to Microsoft, long time 
Microsoft developer Dave Stutz pointed out that:  
"Useful software written above the level of the single device will 
command high margins for a long time to come." 
Of course, any web application can be seen as software above the level 
of a single device. After all, even the simplest web application involves at 
least two computers: the one hosting the web server and the one hosting the 
browser. And as we've discussed, the development of the web as platform 
extends this idea to synthetic applications composed of services provided by 
multiple computers. 
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But as with many areas of Web 2.0, where the "2.0-ness" is not 
something new, but rather a fuller realization of the true potential of the web 
platform, this phrase gives us a key insight into how to design applications 
and services for the new platform. 
To date, iTunes is the best exemple of this principle. This application 
seamlessly reaches from the handheld device to a massive web back-end, 
with the PC acting as a local cache and control station. There have been 
many previous attempts to bring web content to portable devices, but the 
iPod/iTunes combination is one of the first such applications designed from 
the ground up to span multiple devices. TiVo is another good example. 
iTunes and TiVo also demonstrate many of the other core principles of 
Web 2.0. They are not web applications per se, but they leverage the power 
of the web platform, making it a seamless, almost invisible part of their 
infrastructure. Data management is most clearly the heart of their offering. 
They are services, not packaged applications (although in the case of 
iTunes, it can be used as a packaged application, managing only the user's 
local data). What's more, both TiVo and iTunes show some budding use of 
collective intelligence, although in each case, their experiments are at war 
with the IP lobby's. There's only a limited architecture of participation in 
iTunes, though the recent addition of podcasting changes that equation 
substantially. 
This is one of the areas of Web 2.0 where we expect to see some of the 
greatest change, as more and more devices are connected to the new 
platform. What applications become possible when our phones and our cars 
are not consuming data but reporting it? Real time traffic monitoring, flash 
mobs, and citizen journalism are only a few of the early warning signs of the 
capabilities of the new platform. 
  Rich user experiences 
As early as Pei Wei's Viola browser in 1992, the web was being used to 
deliver "applets" and other kinds of active content within the web browser. 
Java's introduction in 1995 was framed around the delivery of such applets. 
JavaScript and then DHTML were introduced as lightweight ways to provide 
client side programmability and richer user experiences. Several years ago, 
Macromedia coined the term "Rich Internet Applications" (which has also 
been picked up by open source Flash competitor Laszlo Systems) to 
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highlight the capabilities of Flash to deliver not just multimedia content, but 
also GUI-style application experiences. 
However, the potential of the web to deliver full scale applications didn't 
hit the mainstream until Google introduced Gmail, quickly followed by 
Google Maps, web-based applications with rich user interfaces and PC-
equivalent interactivity. The collection of technologies used by Google was 
christened AJAX, in a seminal essay by Jesse James Garrett of web design 
firm Adaptive Path. He wrote: 
"Ajax isn't a technology. It's really several technologies, each 
flourishing in its own right, coming together in powerful new ways. Ajax 
incorporates: 
- standards-based presentation using XHTML and CSS,  
- dynamic display and interaction using the Document Object Model,  
- data interchange and manipulation using XML and XSLT,  
- asynchronous data retrieval using XMLHttpRequest,  
- and JavaScript binding everything together."  
AJAX is also a key component of Web 2.0 applications such as Flickr, 
now part of Yahoo!, 37signals' applications basecamp and backpack, as well 
as other Google applications such as Gmail and Orkut. We're entering an 
unprecedented period of user interface innovation, as web developers are 
finally able to build web applications as rich as local PC-based applications. 
Interestingly, many of the capabilities now being explored have been 
around for many years. In the late '90s, both Microsoft and Netscape had a 
vision of the kind of capabilities that are now finally being realized, but their 
battle over the standards to be used made cross-browser applications 
difficult. It was only when Microsoft definitively won the browser wars, and 
there was a single de-facto browser standard to write to, that this kind of 
application became possible. And while Firefox has reintroduced competition 
to the browser market, at least so far we haven't seen the destructive 
competition over web standards that held back progress in the '90s. 
We expect to see many new web applications over the next few years, 
both truly novel applications, and rich web reimplementations of PC 
applications. Every platform change to date has also created opportunities 
for a leadership change in the dominant applications of the previous 
platform. 
Gmail has already provided some interesting innovations in email, 
combining the strengths of the web (accessible from anywhere, deep 
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database competencies, searchability) with user interfaces that approach PC 
interfaces in usability. Meanwhile, other mail clients on the PC platform are 
nibbling away at the problem from the other end, adding IM and presence 
capabilities. How far are we from an integrated communications client 
combining the best of email, IM, and the cell phone, using VoIP to add voice 
capabilities to the rich capabilities of web applications? The race is on. 
It's easy to see how Web 2.0 will also remake the address book. A Web 
2.0-style address book would treat the local address book on the PC or 
phone merely as a cache of the contacts you've explicitly asked the system 
to remember. Meanwhile, a web-based synchronization agent, Gmail-style, 
would remember every message sent or received, every email address and 
every phone number used, and build social networking heuristics to decide 
which ones to offer up as alternatives when an answer wasn't found in the 
local cache. Lacking an answer there, the system would query the broader 
social network. 
A Web 2.0 word processor would support wiki-style collaborative editing, 
not just standalone documents. But it would also support the rich formatting 
we've come to expect in PC-based word processors. Writely is a good 
example of such an application, although it hasn't yet gained wide traction. 
Nor will the Web 2.0 revolution be limited to PC applications. 
Salesforce.com demonstrates how the web can be used to deliver software 
as a service, in enterprise scale applications such as CRM. 
The competitive opportunity for new entrants is to fully embrace the 
potential of Web 2.0. Companies that succeed will create applications that 
learn from their users, using an architecture of participation to build a 
commanding advantage not just in the software interface, but in the richness 
of the shared data. 
  Conclusion: core competencies of Web 2.0 companies 
In exploring the seven principles above, we've highlighted some of the 
principal features of Web 2.0. Each of the examples we've explored 
demonstrates one or more of those key principles, but may miss others. 
Let's close, therefore, by summarizing what we believe to be the core 
competencies of Web 2.0 companies: 
- services, not packaged software, with cost-effective scalability,  
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- control over unique, hard-to-recreate data sources that get richer as 
more people use them, 
- trusting users as co-developers,  
- harnessing collective intelligence,  
- leveraging the long tail through customer self-service,  
- software above the level of a single device,  
- lightweight user interfaces, development models, AND business 
models.  
The next time a company claims that it's "Web 2.0," test their features 
against the list above. The more points they score, the more they are worthy 
of the name. Remember, though, that excellence in one area may be more 
telling than some small steps in all seven. 
 
